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Command authorities are little known, but crucial, instruments in the conveyance of political 
authority to a designated military commander to conduct military operations.  In the context of 
civil-military relations, command authorities act as the nexus between the political authority to 
carry out military operations and their actual execution.  In a coalition/alliance, political 
sensitivities over the transfer of command authorities to a foreign military commander far exceed 
those in solely a national context.  That said, future operations undertaken by the United States 
and its close allies and friends certainly will be multinational.  Thus, all the more reason to 
understand weaknesses and shortcomings in current command authority definitions and the 
practices by which they are delegated. 
                                                 
∗ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government.  The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Professor James Wirtz for 
his constructive comments made on an earlier draft of this paper. 




 Many commentators of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have argued that 
certain technological breakthroughs will have a major affect on the ability of commanders to 
achieve greater operational speed.1  Indeed, high operational speed may be one of the major 
advantages that the RMA offers to field commanders in future.  Global communications systems 
spurred by the explosion in micro-processing and digital technologies will provide commanders 
(perhaps already today and certainly in future) with the ability to reach heights of operational 
speed that far surpass the rates made attainable at any other time in history.2   Given such new 
technological advances, RMA armed forces might be able to overwhelm in extremis (e.g., via 
minimum mass tactics) any force without the benefits of such technology.3  Indeed the U.S. 
armed forces that put to wholesale flight Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm, either 
presage the wave of the future, or manifest the contemporary validity of such theses.4  And 
indeed, some unabashed advocates of air power further argue that the use of modern air power 
and precision-guided weapons during the NATO war against Yugoslavia demonstrate that 
warfare has entered a new phase.5  Not surprisingly, therefore, recent key U.S. planning 
documents have stressed the importance of the RMA and the need for the U.S. armed forces to 
be developed along lines that will enable them to exploit such technological advantages.6 
 But despite some the creative and original work that has been conducted on the impact 
that modern technological innovation will have on future warfare, there has been little analysis of 
how such technological and organizational innovations will affect the political oversight of the 
conduct of war.  This lacuna in the literature has been particularly glaring in terms of the affect 
the RMA will have on coalition warfare.  Whilst much interesting and useful analysis has been 
produced assessing asymmetrical capabilities and organizational structures and the potential fall 
out from such an eventuality (e.g., RMA forces "fight" lethally and safely from a distance and all 




other allies do the "bleeding")7, there appears to be little accompanying analysis of exactly how 
coalition and alliance political oversight will be affected in light of greater operational speed 
available to field commanders.  Surely, the political leadership of any coalition or alliance of 
democracies will want to exploit greater speed (resulting from technological advances or 
organizational innovation) to bring a war or demanding peace-enforcement operation to a quick 
and satisfactory conclusion.  Given that Western democracies only rarely conduct war or peace-
support operations unilaterally, the importance of the alliance/coalition aspects of this question 
takes on added importance. 
 Indeed, a brief assessment the political-military interactions that took place during 
OPERATIONAL ALLIED FORCE shows an existing "delta" between the technologically-
inspired greater operational speed capabilities that were offered and used by NATO (i.e., the 
PGMs and air power capabilities of the U.S. armed forces), and the tortuously slow political-
decision making mechanisms of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).8  According to press reports, 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (now known as "Strategic Commander Europe") was 
unable to employ the full arsenal of RMA-like technological capabilities due to political 
opposition from NATO members, including the U.S. National Command Authorities.9  In 
consequence, General Clarke was unable to unleash more sophisticated capabilities and thereby 
attain a greater degree of operational speed.10  Indeed, if one takes seriously what some RMA 
advocates argue will be exponential increases in operational speed brought on the RMA, then it 
should be clear that some thought should be given at an early stage as to the political 
ramification of such new revolutionary capabilities. 
 That which appears to call for the greatest attention for analysis and study relates to the 
management, or better unity of command of alliances, as opposed to the political oversight of 




purely unilateral campaigns.  Underlying this assertion is the premise that a country has a well-
established national command structure that is sufficiently sophisticated and robust to enable, for 
example, a compression in the levels of war whereby national constitutions, laws and policies are 
not violated.  In such a case, greater operation speed than is currently the norm, can probably be 
accommodated by sophisticated and robust national command structures since theater and 
component commanders in the West are traditional vested with sufficient command authorities to 
respond to opportunities without needing to request additional authorities.  In any case, given the 
contemporary existence of modern digital communications, current and future commanders can 
rest assured that defense ministers and chiefs of defense will be "conveniently" available to 
discuss details aspects of the state of campaigns and what is required.  The example of the rapid 
establishment by the Australian Department of Defence of "Strategic Command" in Canberra in 
1999 that enabled the Australian government to command and direct peace-support operations  
in East Timor (vice using the already existing Australian Theatre Command in Sydney), 
demonstrate that real time political oversight of campaigns due to global digital communications 
is already a factor in many democracies.11  This is not necessarily a disadvantage in that there is 
already the ability to engage in real time dialogue between commanders and senior political 
leadership that would enable the former to gain authority when needed to exploit opportunities 
on the battlefield. 
 Alas alliances, let alone coalitions (ad hoc by their very definition) present a more 
problematic case.  Here, political oversight is effected either in a formal, standing council, e.g., 
the NAC, or through ad hoc political consultative fora.  In either case, from the perspective of a 
coalition or allied commander, political oversight becomes the province of multinational 
discussions and decisions, whilst at the same time, recognizing the continued existence of 




national authorities.12  Therefore, the recent experience of what has been called the most 
successful and surely more institutionally-heavy alliance in history, NATO, demonstrates that 
decision making by the 19 is fraught with a pace that may not be optimally conducive to high-
speed maneuver in a modern conflict.  This should come to be no surprise given that 
governments are loath to give up the use of their forces to a foreign force commander without 
provision for close political oversight.13  Whilst relatively straightforward and simple at the 
national level, in an alliance or coalition, political objectives and methods of attaining them are 
not always in alignment with the greater objective underlying the existence of a campaign.  As 
demonstrated in ALLIED FORCE, 19 nations, each with their own chancelleries, parliaments, 
ministries of foreign affairs, ministries of defense and general/central joint staffs (Iceland being 
an exception in this case), not surprisingly had different views on how the campaign should be 
conducted, when it should be ended, and whether a ground war should be used.14  Although 
guidance to allied commanders is explicitly found in campaign plans authorized by the NAC15 
and the use of force is governed by national and more generally alliance rules of engagement 
(ROE), the means by which political oversight over the use of forces is governed by nations is 
through the use of a number of obscure terms known as "command authorities". 
 This paper examines the problem that existing command practices will pose to the use of 
military force to a coalition/alliance using RMA technologies.  Given the success of NATO as a 
military alliance and the growing worldwide use of many of its basic procedures in militaries 
throughout the world, recent experiences in NATO will be used to demonstrate the existence of 
problems in the current definitions and practices of the use of command authorities.  The paper 
assumes without argument that the RMA, either through technological advances or 
organizational innovation, will give nations in future the ability to conduct operations at a speed 




hitherto unimaginable.16  The reason for accepting without question this perhaps contentious 
assumption is not a result of blind acceptance of what could be a "dodgy" thesis, i.e., that we are 
in the midst of signal transformation in the conduct of warfare.  Rather, the author accepts this 
assumption of greater operational speed because the problem defined in this paper is both a 
contemporary challenge for alliances and coalitions and, if left unreformed, and it will only 
become a more debilitating impediment to success on the battlefield in an era of RMA forces.   
Problem definition: command authorities and their recent "use" in NATO 
The delegation of command authorities to multinational land force commanders remains 
one of the least developed areas of Alliance force employment policy.  Nations have been loath 
to give up command authorities over land forces to foreign commanders out of fear that, inter 
alia, they will be fragmented, incompetently commanded, or confuse the loyalty of officers and 
soldiers.17  Surely the greatest fear of any defense minister in signing the authorization for 
placing his nations forces under a foreign commander is justifying later his decision should they 
be improper employedby a foreign commander no less.  Yet, one should remember that 
"commanders" remain, to quote a recently retired CINCENT, "personally responsible for the 
conduct of operations within their command."18  The  command authorities granted to a 
multinational force commander, however, will govern the degree to which he can  execute his 
missions.   
Land operations present singular problems in multinational operations.  Multinational 
force land commanders require greater command authority than those required by multinational 
aerial and naval commanders.  The missions and inherent operational limitations of aircraft and 
ships are a function of their very design.  Ships and aircraft can best be thought of as integral 
platforms of weapons and systems that can be delegated in their entirety to non-national 




commanders to carry specific tasks.19  Indeed, their technological capabilities essentially define 
and limit their range of tasks.  For navies and air forces, few command authorities need to be 
transferred to a multinational force commander in order to employ these forces.20  Land forces, 
by contrast, should best be thought of as constituting combined-arms teams that need to be 
organized to execute a specific mission.  Thus, the cross-assignment of forces (i.e., task-
organization), the need oftentimes to change missions rapidly to respond to a developing 
situation (favorable or to protect the force), and the legitimate need for a commander to establish 
logistics and training priorities are some of the more sensitive reasons why national leaders are 
reluctant to give up control of their forces to an allied commander. 
In NATO, despite the obvious importance of command authorities, these definitions and 
governing procedures have not received of late the proper attention they deserve.  There are four 
official levels of command authority: 
1. Operational Command, 
2. Operational Control, 
3. Tactical Command, and  
4. Tactical Control 
Significantly, the definitions of these four authorities have not been revised since the early 1980s 
(see Table 1).21  Moreover, an examination of the four definitions (see Table 1) produces the 
following observations:  
1. They have been written in a nuanced and legalistic manner, thereby obviating against 
quick and clear understanding of what they do, and do not, allow.  A review of the 
definitions in Table 1 will establish this fact.   




2. They can be confusing (e.g., the important distinctions between Operational Command 
and Operational Control are not immediately obvious).  When combined with other 
national definitions using the same nomenclature, confusion in understanding what is, 
and is not allowable, is almost inevitable (see Table 2). 
3. Does a definitional silence regarding a specific authority within a specific command 
authority imply "approval"?  Or, is approval of an authority only allowable when it is 
explicitly allowed in a definition?  Interpretations vary. 
4. Within NATO, the delegation of command authority by a senior commander to a 
subordinate is proscribed, except at the lowest level (i.e., TACOM).  Therefore, a NATO 
commander possessing OPCOM or OPCON cannot delegate the same authority to a 
subordinate commander without approval from higher authoritiespolitical and/or 
military. 
5. The authorities themselves do not cover important peacetime responsibilities appropriate 
for multinational formations, e.g., training objectives (i.e., tasks, conditions and 
standards), and logistics requirements and priorities.  Indeed, during peacetime, with the 
exception of the I German-Netherlands Corps, multinational commanders of formations 
declared to NATO do not have any command authority, per se.  Rather, what they 
wield is Coordination Authority which, as implied, is not a command authority.22 
6. Arguably, current definitions were envisaged for a three-tiered command structure, 
within a static strategic environment, as opposed to the fluid international security system 
of today (see below). 
7. Due to NATOs broad definitions of command authorities, nations employ the practice of 
employing "caveats", thereby creating such useful terms as OPCON+ or OPCOM-. 




8. Command authorities, unto themselves therefore, do not reveal the true level of 
multinational integration.  Rather, documents establishing and implementing specific bi-
/multi-national formations must be assessed to ascertain the peacetime authorities of the 
multinational force commander over subordinate units.23 
Closely related to the issue of command authorities is the question of when do forces 
transfer (transfer of authorityTOAor chop) from national command structures for 
operational matters to a multinational land force commander?  This is an important matter.  The 
timing of a decision about when a national force is chopped to a multinational force 
commander will have a major affect upon when important issues such as training objectives and 
standards, logistics requirements and priorities, etc., can be directed, as opposed to 
coordinated.  Greater clarity in NATO doctrine and procedures is needed to establish when 
forces should transfer to a multinational force commander, i.e., prior to, or immediately upon, 
arrival in the theatre of operations.  Frictions between multinational force commanders and 
nations can be expected until such time that important issues like training and logistics priorities 
are addressed.  
NATO found itself ill prepared following the Cold War when using these definitions and 
their implementing procedures in exercises and on operations.  The NATO Central Region 
Chiefs of Army Staff (CR-CAST) in the early 1990s became acutely aware of command 
authority problems for multinational force commanders, particularly during exercises.  In May 
1994, at the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff Talks 1/94, General M. J. Wilmink, RNLA, 
Commander LANDCENT, related a recent exercise experience.  He directed a subordinate force 
to reallocate forces to another national force to react to the battlefield situation.  The time 
required for the subordinate commander to gain approval from his national authorities nearly 




cost Commander LANDCENT the battle.  Experiences of Commander ACE Rapid Reaction 
Corps (ARRC) similarly highlighted limitations of his authority to direct and task organize his 
forces to maintain control of his operational situation.  Simply put, the two commanders did not 
possess the necessary command authorities to direct and organize subordinate national forces to 
accomplish their missions and react to changing circumstances.24  This experience in exercises 
presaged Commander ARRCs difficulties during the force deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as part of IFOR in 1995/96.25 
As a result, the CR-CAST organized a special working group to ascertain a methodology 
ascertaining which command authorities a multinational force commander required.  The 
resulting methodology based its key assumptions upon the need for any determination of 
command authority to be based upon the assigned mission given to the multinational command 
and an examination of the ensuing mission-essential tasks (stated and implied) therein.  The 
conclusions reached by the working group included five critical findings: 
1) An assessment of Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions (and mission-essential tasks), the 
Alliance's new force structure, and the Alliance's New Strategic Concept [1991] indicates 
that a multinational force commander has a clear requirement for OPCON for five of the 
six non-Article 5 missions, and OPCOM for peace enforcement and Article 5 missions. 
 
2) While there are no legal or constitutional proscriptions in any of the Central Region 
countries to prevent granting OPCOM to a multinational force commander, political 
sensitivities may preclude such a decision. 
 
3) The use of the standing integrated command structure in non-Article 5 missions may well 
encourage participating states to grant OPCOM to a multinational force commander.  In 
employing the standing integrated command structure, every nation has the ability to 
influence decisions at the NAC/DPC [North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning 
Committee].  Using the command structure, therefore, should provide added reassurance 
to countries in granting OPCOM to a multinational force commander. 
 
4) National rules of engagement (ROE) must be harmonized and made compatible with 
those of multinational force commanders, prior to transfer of authority (TOA). 
 




5) Significant differences in doctrine and terminology exist in NATO and leading allied 
forces regarding peace support operations.  Such differences could inhibit the successful 
execution of a NATO non-Article 5 operation.26 
 
Employing the CR-CAST methodology resulted in the following recommendations to 
guide the selection of command authorities for a multinational corps commander: 
1) Article 5 collective defense: operational command (OPCOM) 
 
2) Non-Article 5 peace-support operations: 
 
(a) Peace enforcement: OPCOM 
(b) Conflict prevention: operational control (OPCON) 
(c) Peacemaking: OPCON 
(d) Peacekeeping: OPCON 
(e) Humanitarian aid: OPCON 
(f) Peace building: OPCON 
 
The requirement for a higher command authority (OPCOM) in collective defense and 
peace enforcement was based on the need for the commander to carryout combat operations (the 
most difficult and demanding) and for the commander to be capable of being able to react 
quickly to protect the force.  Under current NATO procedures, OPCOM cannot be delegated by 
a Strategic Commander (he can only delegate OPCON), without prior political approval by the 
contributing nation.27 
The subsequent deployment by NATO of forces to the Bosnia-Herzegovina (Peace 
Implementation Force--IFOR and the NATO Stabilization Force--SFOR) and Kosovo (NATO 
Force in Kosovo--KFOR) demonstrated severe weaknesses in the use of NATO command 
authority definitions and the practice in which they have been employed. 28   It should come as no 
surprise that in the aftermath of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE General Nauman stated:  
I think one has to make sure that a NATO Commander is given the maximum unity of 
command and the right to really see it through.  Nations, I think, have to think throughI 
should put as cautiously as I canthey should prepare to think through to which degree 
they are really willing to transfer authority to NATO.  At the moment the formulas which 
we have definitely allow for improvements under difficult considerations, as we had.29 





In light of these recent operational experiences in NATO, three major problems with 
command definitions and procedures are apparent: 1) multinationality, 2) new missions, and 3) 
command authorities at variance with levels of command. 
1. Deeper multinationality.  During the Cold War, multinationality of land forces was 
almost exclusively effected at the national corps level; the exception being Corps 
LANDJUT (now renamed, Multinational Corps Northeast and located in Stettin, Poland).  
Since then, in an effort to protect force structure and maintain expertise at higher levels of 
command, there now exists multinational land formations declared to the Alliance down 
to the level of multinational corps and even divisions.  And, as demonstrated in Table 3, 
there is no NATO policy, let alone a common approach, to establishing command 
authority requirements at specific levels of command.  Moreover, there has been no 
concerted effort amongst all nations to ascertain if existing definitions match the mission 
requirements of multinational force commanders.  To be sure, issues related to 
administrative matters, or as referred to in NATO as "Full Command" (i.e., the power to 
"enforce") are, and will always remain, within the purview of a sovereign state.  Yet, no 
one would seriously challenge a national corps or division commander's professional 
responsibility to meet the training and readiness standards established by his higher 
authorities.  Current command arrangements or practices in NATO hinder the 
achievement of these goals. 
2. New missions.  The mission spectrum for many forces declared to NATO has increased 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War.  Indeed, one can make the case that Reaction 
Forces for undertaking non-Article 5, peace support operations, are now the dominant 
mission of most forces declared to the Alliance, as opposed to meeting less immediate 




collective self-defense missions by using Main Defence forces.30  These new missions 
have two important characteristics.  First, they almost exclusively tend to be executed 
within a multinational formation.  Second, whilst the missions and mission-essential tasks 
are not as demanding as collect-self defense missions, they are still demanding in the 
context of civil-military relations.  Whereas in the event of failure in a peace-support 
operation, there is little, if any, fall-out for national vital interests, the implications for 
domestic politics can be considerable.  Thus, nations have found the ambiguity afforded 
by nuanced command authority definitions advantageous since it allows for appearance 
of multinationality, without actually giving up authority to allow the commander to 
carryout the tasks he has been assigned.31 
3. Blurring of command levels.  Probably one of the least recognized problems in the 
Alliance has been caused by the reorganization of the integrated command structure,32 
without accompanying review and reform of command authorities.  The reform of the 
integrated command structure and the introduction, but as yet full acceptance of, the 
Combined Joint Task Force concept,33 have not resulted in a review of the number of 
command authorities and their definition in order to ascertain if they are supportive of 
these new structures.  In other words, one would think that there would not be more 
command levels than authorities, otherwise the question could be raised: what is the 
value-added of all of these levels of command they exceed the number of extant 
authorities? 
In the U.S. system of command authorities as established by Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed 
Forces, and implemented by Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),34 for example, 




there are three distinct levels of command that are supported by three different levels of 
command authority: 
Combatant Commanders-in-Chief possess: combatant command 
Component Commanders possess: operational control 
Service Commanders possess: tactical control 
 
During the Cold War, NATO developed command authorities that fit neatly into a similar 
construct: 
Supreme Allied Commanders possessed:  OPCOM 
Major Subordinate Commanders possessed:             OPCON (+/-) 
Sub-Ordinate Commanders possessed:                      TACON (+/-) 
National corps commanders possessed:                     National (Full) command 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the integrated military command structure of NATO has 
been reorganized, largely guided by political considerations.35  As a result, the Alliance 
currently finds itself in a situation in which levels of command and span of control over 
subordinated units, do not match command authorities: 
Strategic Commanders possess:                     OPCOM 
Regional Commanders possess:                       OPCOM/OPCON (+/-)? 
JSRC*/Component Commanders possess:               OPCOM/OPCON(+/-)? 
Multinational commanders possess:                         OPCON/TACON? 
National commanders possess:                                 National Full command 
* Joint Sub-Regional Commander (formerly Principal Sub-ordinate Commander) 
As the CR-CAST working group on command authorities determined in 1994/5, 
command authorities for a multinational force commander ought to be determined in a 
bottom-up fashion where the mission of the commander should be the starting point for 
determining which authorities are appropriate.  Using this methodology one finds that for 
many missions, if a multinational force commander at the fourth level of command 
possesses OPCOM or OPCON, what military value can possible accrue to him needing to 




report through numerous superior commander, who possess the same authorities, to a 
Strategic Commander, and eventually, to the North Atlantic Council? 
Political realities and procedural options 
Thus, the case would appear strong that command in NATO at present is far from having 
been reformed to bring it into line with the operating realities of the emerging strategic 
environment.  That NATO, touted by many, as being historys most successful alliance, has been 
unable to address this important problem to date, obviously presages similar challenges to 
coalitions and future alliances.  To be sure, one would be imprudent to assume that nations are 
willing to give up their forces to a foreign commander for their operational employment 
without mechanisms and procedures to ensure that national interests are not infringed upon, nor 
the forces misemployed.  And, indeed, recent experience in peace-support operations in Europe 
and the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) demonstrate that national political 
leadership have been quick to seize the advantages provided by modern digital communications 
that now allows them to oversee and even direct tactical operations during operations.   
Two issues require analysis if the problem of alliance command can be solved.  First, 
political decision-making is unlikely to change significantly in future.  Naturally, technology can 
provide modern political leaders with elaborate and sophisticated decision-support technologies.  
Decisions, however, will remain a human endeavor and responsibility.  Second, assuming the 
digital communications continue to evolve and improve, it would appear to be safe to assume 
that the fidelity in communications between the operational/tactical commander and national 
political leaders will become more refined and instantaneous.  If the ability of commanders to 
improve operational speed of maneuver continues, future tensions loom large in that critical and 
delicate area of civil-military relations: the transformation of guidance issued by political leaders 




into military directives by senior military officials.  Take this envisaged situation and overlay the 
complications that come with an alliance/coalition (with differing national command lines and 
procedures) and the immediacy of finding potential solutions takes on even greater contemporary 
importance. 
To summarize the different requirement of political and military leadership the following 
generations can be gleaned: 
1) What politicians need: 
 
(a) Clear control (and accountability) over the authorities they grant to a coalition 
commander. 
 
(b) The ability quickly to change authorities to reflect: 
 
(i) Altered political commitment 
(ii) New political direction 
(iii) Take advantage of favorable operational situations 
 
2) What military officials and commanders desire: 
 
(a) Clear guidance of how they can employ coalition/allied forces. 
 
(b) The ability quickly to request changes in authorities based upon established clear 
procedures that have been developed, tested and validated in simulations and 
exercises, vice having to rely upon ambiguous definitions to meet favorable 
operational opportunities or defend the force. 
 
(c) The ability to realize advantages of great operational speed resulting from the RMA. 
 
 The basis determining command authorities should follow the key recommendation of 
the CR-CAST working group study, that is, basing command authority requirements upon the 
given mission.  Should command authorities in a particular operation fall short of those needed, 
this should be the result of a clear political decision, as opposed to the result of the application of 
an ambiguous and/or nuanced interpretation of flawed procedures.  Moreover, given the recent 
ample evidence that presages difficulty in effecting successfully future multinational land 




operations, any reform of the current system of definitions and procedures should err on the side 
of addressing singular requirements of land forces.  In this respect, the necessity of multinational 
land commanders to be able to (re)assign missions and task-organize subordinate formations 
needs to be addressed.  Admittedly, these are politically sensitive issues given that they affect the 
very constitution and employment of armies.  However, without acknowledging the peculiar 
nature of multinational land forces, any reform effort is likely to be less than optimal. 
 Apropos the actual reform of command authorities important consideration should be 
given to the proposition that terms, e.g., operational control, etc., have proven themselves 
less than useful in conveying quickly the intent of superior authorities.  For example, in the 
current U.S. defense lexicon there are four quite distinct definitions of operational control 
(OPCON): 
(a) UNAAF definition, as derived from Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces.36 
(b) NATO37 
(c) PDD-25 that established the Clinton administrations policy toward U.S. participation 
in peace-support operations.  The definition of operational control employed in the 
document is more similar to the UNAAF definition of TACON, than that of 
OPCON.38 
(d) U.S. Korean Combined Command. 
The United States is not alone in operating in definitional confusion and ambiguity concerning 
command authorities.  On a number of occasions, the current writer has been informed by French 
defense and military officials that commandement operationelle (OPCOM) in French military 
usage is (essentially) defined as Full or National Command, as opposed to its use in NATO 
where in it is subordinate to Full or National Command. 




Indeed, one can question the utility of the use of terms for such a widely varied and 
complicated issue as command.  In other words, one could ponder whether the introduction of 
(yet) another definition of OPCON will do more harm than improve matters.  In fact, the 
simple use of terms such as command in a command authority could be counter-productive.  
After all, operational command implies, to the uninitiated, authorities that all but constitute 
sovereign responsibilities, and even sounds all too similar to Full Command.  The point being 
made here is that language as manifested in the form of a small number of nuanced formal 
definitions, is not the best means of conveying precise political guidance to military authorities.  
In other words, given the nature of multinational operations, particularly those involving land 
forces, the authorities as contained in current definitions are not only not useful, but dangerously 
so.  The fact that nations resort to adding ad hoc caveats when granting authorities manifests 
their unwieldy nature. 
A solution to the issue of terms and definitions is to approach command authorities in the 
same manner as nations address the employment of force, i.e., rules of engagement (ROE).  To 
be sure, ROE and command authorities are not the same.  One addresses the employment of 
force and what can and cannot be targeted, whilst the other addresses how forces are employed.  
However, they do share an important similarity in that they are the vehicles to translate political 
guidance into military force.  The advantage of approaching the delegation of command 
authorities in the same manner as ROE is that ROE are structured in such a way that there is no 
doubt in anyones mind whether an action is allowable or not.  For example, during the second 
phase of the CR-CAST working group mentioned above, the group was directed to develop land 
ROE suitable for a NATO multinational force commander.  (It is noteworthy that this was the 




first effort to develop ROE specifically for a NATO multinational force commander at the army 
corps level.)  The following text is taken from that document: 
10.24.  USE OF LETHAL FORCE AGAINST FORCES DESIGNATED HOSTILE 
FORCES OR THOSE COMMITTING HOSTILE ACTS AND EVIDENCING HOSTILE  
INTENT: 
 
Purpose.  To authorize the use of lethal force against forces designated hostile, those which 
commit a hostile act or which evidence hostile intent. 
 
     Lethal force is not authorized. 
 
     Designated [      ] forces are not declared hostile but are to be engaged when committing 
hostile acts or evidencing hostile intent against NATO forces: 
 
 a.  Use [      ] force(s) only. 
 
 b.  Use all necessary means available. 
 
     Designated [      ] forces are not declared hostile but are to be engaged when committing 
hostile acts or evidencing hostile intent against non-NATO forces within  [(distance)] of NATO 
forces. 
 
     Designated [      ] factions are not declared hostile but use of lethal force to separate or control 
factions is authorized under the following conditions: 
 
 a.  Use [      ] force(s) only. 
 
 b.  Use all necessary means available. 
 
     Designated [      ] forces are declared hostile. 
 
 a.  Use [      ] force only. 
 
b.  Use all necessary means available.39 
 This section illustrates the point that both a commander and senior political leadership 
can be in no doubt as to what is intended and what can be done.  Applying this simple 
methodology to command authorities, the following list could be developed. 
Command authorities: 
a. Assignment of missions [is] [is not] authorized. 




b. Reassignment of missions [is] [is not] authorized. 
c. Task-organization of subordinated forces [is] [is not] authorized. 
d. Task-organization of subordinated forces is authorized of subordinated units [one], 
[two], [three] echelons below the highest level of national command. 
e. Delegation of invested command authorities [are] [are not] authorized. 
f. Delegation of invested command authorities are authorized [one], [two], [three] 
echelons below first subordinated commander. 
g. Assignment of logistics priorities [is] [is not] authorized. 
Such a method and system of discerning and representing the specific authorities allocated to a 
multinational force commander would have advantages for both politicians (who crave 
ambiguity) and the military (who seek certitude).  To use the criteria cited above, such a system 
would give politicians: 
1) Certainly of clear control of their armed forces. 
2) An improved ability to change specific authorities in the event of an altered (positive 
or negative) political commitment and/or direction of policy. 
 
The multinational force commander and national component commanders likely would benefit 
from such a system in that they would have: 
1) Clear guidance of how they can employ subordinated coalition/allied forces. 
2) The ability to request quickly changes in authorities to take advantage of operational 
opportunities/defend the force, based upon established clear procedures that had been 
developed, tested and validated in simulations and exercises, vice having to rely upon 
ambiguous definitions (viz., OPCON-) to meet operational requirements. 
3) The ability to realize advantages of great operational speed resulting from the RMA. 
 
An important caveat needs to be stressed concerning this proposed concept reforming the 
structure, organization and procedures for delegating and changing command authorities.  This 
is, as yet, only a concept.  While it is the result of a number of years of observing the command 
of coalition operations, contemplation and extensive discussions with past and present 




multinational force commanders, it has yet to be formally developed, evaluated, and importantly, 
validated.  Apropos the last point, one would expect that extensive politico-military seminars, 
command-post exercises, computer-assisted simulations, and perhaps even and a small part of 
planned field-exercises, should be conducted before proposing such a radical reform of 
command authorities to national authorities.  Some resistance on the part of the maritime and air 
services in allied countries might also be expected given that they do not suffer the same 
debilitations in operations when operating in coalitions as do armies.  And, to be sure, one would 
expect that such reforms certainly would need to be seen as supporting, if not ameliorating, joint 
(in addition to combined) operations if it is to be successful.  Clearly, therefore, much 
preparation, both substantive and bureaucratic, is required if this problem is to be overcome.  
A final point needs to be mentioned.  The ABCA Armies Standardization Program has 
been in existence for over 50 years and includes the armies of America, Britain, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  Historically, it has provided a forum for the five armies to discuss 
areas of mutual interest and to work to effect interoperability.  Presently, one of this programs 
principal areas of emphasis has been to improve combined coalition operations.  For example, 
the program recently published a very useful coalition operations40 and logistics planning 
guides.41  At the 11th Washington Standardization Officers/Standing Chairmens Meeting, 4th 
November 1999, the current author raised these issues in the form a briefing.  The thesis of the 
briefing was that NATO had been, to date, incapable of coming to terms with the issue of 
developing appropriate command authorities for multinational force commanders.   In 
consequence, the ABCA Armies were challenged to take the lead in developing a new 
methodology, similar to the one suggested above.  The ABCA Armies has accepted this 




challenge and are currently working on developing such a new approach and format for 
command authorities. 
Conclusion 
 The jury is out, and is likely to remain so for some time, on the issue of whether the 
world, and the United States in particular, is in the midst of a revolution in military affairs.  What 
is clear is that if nothing else, global and instantaneous communications are likely to continue to 
improve, thereby compressing, levels of command.  If greater operational speed is realized as 
well through the introduction of new technologies than one can foresee serious civil-military 
challenges in the years ahead.  These challenges will be most acutely felt in alliances and 
coalitions.  In these cases, the added complexity of supra-national political oversight will 
complicate the direction and conduct of multinational operations, particularly those employing 
land forces.  The Western world and particularly the Anglo-Saxon democracies rarely fight wars 
or carryout peace-support operations unilaterally.  Therefore, it is incumbent that initiatives to 
reform of existing command authorities begin with a strong degree of urgency. 
 There is, as yet, no firm policy or apparent formal understanding amongst the Western 
Alliance of which authorities a multinational force commander requires.  Even the superb ABCA 
Armies Coalition Operations Handbook fails to address this issue effectively.  The work 
observes that nations normally will assign OPCON to a multinational force commander.42  What 
is left unsaid is which OPCON is normally assigned, let alone what happens, or should 
happen, when this is insufficient.  That the ABCA armies, who enjoy a long history of enjoying a 
high degree of interoperability, fail to have an effective policy for recommending appropriate 
command authorities required by a multinational force commander, demonstrates the need for 
greater attention to this issue. 




Indeed, given the failure of NATO as a whole to address this problem to date, it would 
appear that the ABCA Armies have an important role to play in leading the way to find a 
solution to this problem.  Whether the development of an ROE-type command authorities format 
is the most appropriate or effective means of enabling a better means of transmitting national 
level policy guidance into military guidance remains to be seen.  By this, an intensive program of 
development, assessment and validation is required before recommendations for change should 
be proposed.  However, whatever transpires either in the ABCA Armies program or NATO, let 
there be little doubt that without reform, the Western Alliance runs the risk of military reversals 
and shedding bloody needlessly in a future coalition operation using existing command 
authorities and procedures.  Heretofore, peace-support operations commanded by NATO in the 
Balkans Australia in East Timor have yet to be seriously tested with intense violence over a long 
period of time by a determined opponent.  It is a brave individual who will predict that this good 









Definition of NATO/ABCA Command Authorities 
 
Operational Command: 
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to 
deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as 
may be deemed necessary.  It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or 
logistics.  May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. 01/08/74 
 
Operational Control: 
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may 
accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to 
deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to those units.  It does not include 
authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.  Neither does it, 
of itself, include administrative or logistic control. 01/06/84 
 
Tactical Command: 
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the 
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. 01/09/74 
 
Tactical Control: 
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to 
accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 01/11/80 
 
Coordinating Authority (N.B: Not a command authority): 
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating 
specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or 
more services or two or more forces of the same service.  He has the authority to require 
consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the 
authority to compel agreement.  In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he 
should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion.  In the event he is unable to obtain 
essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. 01/07/85 
 
Integrated Directing and Control Authority (Employed only by CG 1 GE/NE Corps): 
This authority provides the Commander with powers that are identical or similar to those vested 
in a commander of a national corps or with powers that are altogether new.  Sovereign national 
rights (in the narrowest sense) are excepted.  The CG has the right to give instructions to all 
subordinate military and civilian personnel and may issue directives to the bi-national and 
national elements of the Corps and set priorities. 
 
Source:  MC 57/3, Overall Organisation of the Integrated NATO Forces; and, AAP-6(U), NATO 
Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), January 1995; 1 (GE/NL Corps), Sankt 
Augustin: CPM Communications Presse Marketing GmbH, 1999, pp. 8-9. 





Comparison of NATO and U.S. Command Authority Definitions 
Most control<-------->Least control 
AUTHORITY 
 
OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON 
 
GRANTED TO A COMMANDER 
 
NATO 
   
REASSIGN OPCOM (i.e., RETURN IT) NATO    
RETAIN OPCOM NATO U.S.   
DELEGATE OPCON NATO NATO 
w/aprvl/U.S. 
  
DELEGATE TO A COMMANDER  NATO NATO  
SUPERIOR TO TACOM  NATO   
ASSIGN TACOM  NATO   




DELEGATE TACON NATO NATO   
ASSIGN MISSION NATO    
ASSIGN TASKS NATO U.S. NATO  
DIRECT FORCES (GIVE ORDERS)  NATO 
/U.S. 
  
REASSIGN FORCES NATO    
DEPLOY FORCES NATO NATO  NATO/ 
U.S. 
LOCAL DIRECTION & CONTROL OF 
MOVEMENTS & MANEUVER 
 U.S.  NATO 
/U.S. 














ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL  NATO-NO   
LOGISTICS SUPPORT/COMMAND NATO-
NO 
   
LOGISTICS CONTROL  NATO-NO   
N.B.: "full command", or the authority to enforce.   (NATO only: no NATO commander has full 
command over forces assigned to him because nations assign only OPCOM or OPCON. 
Key: 
1. "NATO" - specifically permitted in a NATO publication 
2. "NATO-No" - specifically prohibited in a NATO publication 
3. "U.S." - authorized in u.s. doctrine 
4. Blank - not mentioned in any NATO publication 
 





Command Authorities of NATO and European 
Bi-/Multi-national Formations 
 
Bi-/multinational corps declared to NATO: 
 
1.  Corps LANDJUT/"Multinational  OPCON/OPCOM* (in  
 Corps Northeast" wartime) 
 
2.  I German/Netherlands Corps+ OPCON (in peacetime)# 
OPCOM (when employed) 
 
3.  V U.S./German Corps OPCON (in wartime) 
 
4.  II German/U.S. Corps OPCON (in wartime) 
 
5.  ACE Rapid Reaction Corps 
 (a) National Divisions OPCON (in wartime) 
 (b) Multinational Division (Central)+ OPCOM>^ 
 
Bi-/multinational divisions declared to the ARRC: 
 
6.  1st United Kingdom Armoured Division OPCON (in wartime) 
 (a) Danish International Coordinating Authority 
      Mechanized Brigade (in peacetime)  
 (b) 4th Czech Brigáda rychlého OPCON∑ 
      Nasazení (4th Rapid Reaction 
      Brigade) 
 
7. 3rd United Kingdom Division OPCON (in wartime) 
 Italian Ariete  Coordinating Authority 
 Mechanized Brigade (in peacetime)  
 
8.  3rd Italian Division OPCON (in wartime) 
Portuguese Independent Airborne Coordinating Authority 
 Brigade (in peacetime)  
 
9.  7th German Panzer Division OPCON∑ 
10th Polish Brygada Kawalerii 
Pancernej (10th Armoured  
Cavalry Brigade) 
 
10.  1st US Armoured Division OPCON∑ 
25th Hungarian Klapka György 
Gépesített Lövész dandá (25th 
Mechanized Infantry Brigade) 






11.  European Corps (EUROCORPS)+ OPCOM (when deployed) 
 
12.  European Rapid Operational Force OPCON (when 
        (EUROFOR)+ deployed) 
____________ 
* By agreement, Commander Corps LANDJUT has OPCON of forces under his command.  
However, in exercises, it has been the tradition for 30 years for Commander Corps LANDJUT to 
exercise OPCOM. 
+ "Force Answerable to the Western European Union (FAWEU)." 
# The Corps Commander also now has Integrated Directing and Control Authority."  This 
authority provides the Commander with powers that are identical or similar to those vested in a 
commander of a national corps or with powers that are altogether new.  Note that sovereign 
rights (in the narrowest sense) are excepted.  That said, the Corps Commander has the right to 
give instructions to all subordinate military and civilian personnel and may issue directives to the 
binational and national elements of the Corps and set priorities.   
> Multinational Division (Central) headquarters is OPCOM to Commander ARRC in peacetime. 
^ Assigned brigades are under OPCON to Commander ARRC in peacetime. 
∑The command authorities for these formations have yet to be fully confirmed via the NATO 
force generation process. 
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